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Abstract — Passports and other identification documents 
may be enhanced using recent advancements in technology.  
Various national and international bodies are pursuing 
machine-readable approaches with biometric information.  In 
particular, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) has adopted standards whereby passports can store 
biometric identifiers.  Countries that participate in the Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP) began issuing electronic passports in 
2006.  However, the selection of technologies remains 
questionable due to privacy and security concerns.  This paper 
examines policy regarding these electronic approaches and 
developments toward electronic data storage and transmission.  
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) devices for electronic 
passports and other existing identity documents are discussed. 
Keywords — Electronic Passport, Biometrics, RFID. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ravel among countries and security concerns are 
driving efforts to improve the identification and 
passport documents.  The international community is 
debating policy and technologies regarding electronic 
approaches such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
devices.  To facilitate travel, the twenty-seven member 
nations participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) 
require standardized passport documents [1] based on 
standards determined by the International Civil Aviation 
organization (ICAO).  The threat of terrorism increases the 
need for positive identification and anti-counterfeiting.  The 
challenge facing immigration officials today is simple:  How 
do they know that the person carrying the passport is 
actually the rightful owner of the passport?  A 2” X 2” 
photograph of the owner only provides so many clues as to 
the answer to this question and photographic means have 
security limitations.  Considering that all of the 9/11 
hijackers immigrated or traveled to the U.S. from other 
countries, it is of the utmost importance to the security of 
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this country that homeland security and immigration 
officials be confident that they know who is entering and 
exiting the country.  Current passports contain biographical 
information, photographs, and anti-counterfeiting features 
like words in invisible ink that are only visible under 
ultraviolet light. 
To help answer this important question, the U.S. Congress 
began requiring that all countries participating in the Visa 
Waiver Program, issue a technologically-enhanced passport 
based on international standards, including contactless smart 
chips.  This new travel document contains electronically 
stored personal information, along with a digital photograph 
of the person to whom the passport was issued.  The digital 
picture allows immigration officers to perform biometric 
comparisons of the individual requesting entry into the 
United States with the stored picture to determine if the 
person is the rightful owner of the passport. The U.S. 
required that all member countries of the VWP began 
issuing electronic passports by October 2006.  The State 
Department also began issuing small numbers of electronic 
passports to U.S. diplomats and associated personnel in 
early 2006, and public issuance has gradually increased 
beginning in August 2006.  International standards are 
included in the International Civil Aviation Organization 
Document 9303. 
This work examines the role of contactless integrated 
circuit (IC) technology, commonly referred to as RFID, and 
other technologies for existing and potential impact on 
electronic passports.  Various efforts are underway to 
modernize many U.S. identity documents, both political and 
technical..  Policy discussion includes privacy concerns and 
the selection of secure technologies.  In particular, we 
discuss how RFID technologies have advantages and 
disadvantages for electronic passports and other 
identification documents. 
II. ELECTRONIC IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 
A. Overview of U.S. Passport and VWP Program 
The most commonly used method of establishing identity 
and citizenship for use in international travel is the passport.  
Of the numerous passports in the world, a United States 
passport is often considered the “holy grail” of travel 
documents, widely respected and accepted by virtually all 
nations.  In 2004 nearly nine million U.S. passports were 
issued [2].   The U.S. Department of State, in conjunction 
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with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), began 
issuing a redesigned passport with incorporated technology 
to defend against misuse and fraudulent reproduction in 
limited numbers to U.S. citizens on August 14, 2006. 
Nations also often require certain visitors to apply for a 
visa or official authorization from the government in order 
to enter.  Several western European nations, some south 
Pacific nations, Japan, and the United States participate in 
the Visa Waiver Program, which allows travelers from any 
member country to travel to another member country for up 
to 90 days without obtaining a visa.  Established in 1986, the 
program aims to improve international travel by “promoting 
better relations with U.S. allies, eliminating unnecessary 
barriers to travel, stimulating the tourism industry, and 
permitting the Department of State to focus consular 
resources in other areas” [1]. VWP countries generally 
follow the guidance of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), an arm of the United Nations, with 
respect to passport design and often take part in the body’s 
decision-making process [3]. 
 
B.  Political Timeline for Biometric/Electronic Passports 
The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. pushed national security to 
the forefront of American politics.  As the U.S. began its 
invasion of Afghanistan and assault on the ruling Taliban 
regime, Congress and the executive branch searched for 
holes in the nation’s intelligence and security infrastructure.  
Simultaneously with its pursuit of the Patriot Act, the federal 
government sought both policy and technology-based 
solutions to the porous border issue.  The Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 set, among 
numerous other items, “technology standard and 
interoperability requirements respecting development and 
implementation of the integrated entry and exit data system 
and related tamper-resistant, machine-readable documents 
containing biometric identifiers” (including October 26, 
2004 implementation deadlines) [4]. Sponsored by Rep. 
James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), House Judiciary 
Committee chairman, the legislation called for total 
compliance with ICAO standards for electronic/biometric 
passports by VWP countries.  The law did not specify which 
revision of the standards needed to be complied with, 
leading to some recent confusion over what requirements 
VWP countries needed to meet. 
C. Other Federal Government Identity Documents 
Numerous recent deployments of technology-based 
identity documents have taken place under the auspices of 
government agencies other than the State Department, and 
more are likely to occur in the near future.  In fact, the lack 
of a government-wide standard for identity documents has 
been greatly criticized. 
 Perhaps the most notable recent deployment of identity 
documents was initiated by the Department of Defense and 
applies to all military and civilian personnel.  Approved in 
2001, the Common Access Card (CAC) is now the main 
form of identification used by Defense employees, serving 
as the primary indicator of authority to enter U.S. military 
bases and allowing authorized users to access classified and 
unclassified computer resources.  All CAC’s contain a 
contact IC smart chip, as compared to the contactless RFID, 
which stores credentials and authentication information [5].   
The contact chip requires the user to remove the card and 
slide it into a reader in order to access the digitally signed 
and encrypted stored personal information.  The CAC also 
features one-dimensional and two-dimensional barcodes for 
quicker access to basic, unprotected information. 
 On the other hand, the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Treasury Department are known to 
use RFID technology for internal access control purposes 
[6]. 
 
D. State-Issued Driver’s Licenses and Real ID 
The most common form of identification used in the 
United States is the state-issued driver’s license.  Each state 
has its own design, with most currently in circulation having 
some embedded technology for the purpose of verification 
or guarding against counterfeit documents.  Informal 
agreements exist for standardization of these identity 
documents, but no overarching standard currently exists. 
Table I indicates the current deployment of widely used 
driver’s license technologies by specific technology. 
An upcoming potential technology deployment which has 
garnered substantial attention from politicians and privacy 
advocates is the implementation of the Real ID Act of 2005.  
Passed in May 2005 as part of an emergency supplemental 
appropriations bill for the ongoing war in Iraq, the law calls 
for interoperability of state driver’s license databases, along 
with a “common machine-readable technology” for all 
driver’s licenses issued nationwide [8]. Nothing in the law 
dictates what that technology will be, what it will store, or if 
it can be used to store biometric data.  The Department of 
Homeland Security is charged with determining the 
standards for these newly revised licenses, and the law 
specifies 2008 as the year when the DHS-specified standards 
will go into effect. 
TABLE I 
IMPLEMENTED STATE LICENSE TECHNOLOGIES 
Technology Number of State Implementations  
Magnetic Stripe 21 
1-D Barcode 21 
2-D Barcode 45 
None 1 
 
Summary of technologies used to validate and verify 
driver’s licenses in all 50 states.  Some states use more than 







III. ELECTRONIC PASSPORT ICAO STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT 
A.  Changes to Passport Design 
The first major requirement instituted by the ICAO and 
subsequently by the United States was the inclusion of a 
machine-readable zone (MRZ) on the passport.  Through the 
use of optical character recognition hardware and software, 
a computer can read and capture the data printed in the 
MRZ, eliminating the need for an immigration or customs 
officer to manually enter and confirm a portion of the data 
contained on the passport. The MRZ is the lower two lines 
of text on the document in Fig. 1. 
Beginning on June 26, 2005, all VWP travelers entering 
the United States were required to possess a passport with an 
MRZ [10]. The use of standard placement and data 
formatting, as established by the ICAO, has allowed for 
relatively uniform dispersion of this technology. 
While inclusion of the MRZ sped up passport processing, 
it did little to improve the document’s inherent security.  The 
practice of removing a passport holder’s picture and 
replacing it with another, however, has garnered much 
attention as a potentially simple means of committing 
passport fraud.  To guard against this security flaw, the U.S. 
has required that passports from VWP countries all contain 
what the State Department calls a “digital photograph” on 
the data page.  While there is nothing digital about the 
printed picture itself, the fact that it is printed directly onto 
the data page, rather than being subsequently attached, 
guards against fraud.  U.S. passports have contained these 
digital photographs for several years, and under new 
Department of Homeland Security guidelines, all VWP 
countries were required to produce similarly protected 
passports by October 26, 2005, in order for their passports to 
continue to be accepted at American points of entry. 
 
B. The Move to Biometric Technologies 
Beginning in 1980 the ICAO looked to emerging 
technologies to enhance the security of passports and 
identity documents, and in 1999 its Technical Advisory 
Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) 
began investigating “the compatibility of currently available 
biometric technologies with the issuance and inspection 
processes relevant to MRTDs.” [11] According to the 
Biometric Consortium, “Biometrics are automated methods 
of recognizing a person based on a physiological or 
behavioral characteristic.” [12]  Many of the earliest uses of 
primitive biometrics technology focused on identification of 
criminals.  In 1903 the New York state prison system began 
using fingerprints to identify criminals, and in 1921 
Congress established the Identification Division of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation [13]. 
The ICAO’s New Technologies Working Group (NTWG) 
looked to biometric comparisons as a more conclusive 
means of authenticating documents, both through comparing 
printed data to electronic data and comparing stored 
biometric data against samples from the individual 
attempting to use the passport.  The overriding concern was 
confirming that the holder of the passport was actually the 
rightful owner of the document.  In February 2002, the 
NTWG endorsed facial feature, fingerprint, and iris 
recognition technologies as applicable to machine-readable 
travel documents (MRTDs).  Subsequently, in Berlin in June 
2002, the NTWG endorsed the “use of face recognition as 
the globally interoperable biometric for machine assisted 
identity confirmation with machine readable travel 
documents,” leaving iris and fingerprint technologies as 
optional additions [14]. 
 
C. Data Storage Technologies 
One of the greatest challenges facing the ICAO was the 
selection of a technology for storing biometric and other 
data onboard the passport.  The generally accepted 
technologies included two-dimensional bar codes, contact 
integrated circuit (IC) chips, contactless IC chips, and 
optical memory.  Each technology has its advantages and 
drawbacks.  Several guidelines were used in determining a 
standard [15]. 
 
• Non-proprietary technology was required. 
• “Document integrity” needed to be maintained. 
• Stored data needed to be easily accessible. 
• Quick transmission times were preferred. 
• Memory needed to support in excess of 20 KB of 
storage on one chip or equivalent. 
 
Two-dimensional bar code technology did not meet the 
image file storage space requirement, and was eliminated 
from consideration on most other counts as well.  
Contactless IC chips showed shorter transmission times than 
contact chips and also assisted the ICAO’s goal of making it 
easy to access the stored data, since they can be 
electronically read in any orientation as long as they are 
 
Fig. 1.  An Australian passport data page with visible machine 





within range of the chip reader.  As a result, the ICAO stated 
in its March 21, 2003 New Orleans Resolution,  
 
Member States, in their initial deployment of MRTDs 
with biometrics identifiers, are encouraged to adopt 
Contactless IC media of sufficient capacity to facilitate 
on-board storage of additional MRTD data and 
biometric identifiers [15]. 
 
According to the main ICAO technical specification for 
biometric passports, Document 9303, all of the data 
currently printed on the data page of the passport must be 
stored on the IC chip.  This includes the photograph, which 
will be used for biometric comparisons.  The Logical Data 
Structure, specified in Document 9303, provides a 
comprehensive architecture for storing this information, 
along with additional optional information an individual 
country might choose to include either for added security or 
to allow the document to serve purposes other than those 
normally attributed to the passport [16]. 
The ICAO has included digital signature protection based 
on the public key infrastructure (PKI) to help authorities 
confirm that the data stored on a passport’s RFID chip had 
not been modified.  A digital signature is a hash table 
created using a publicly available key.  This table can be 
compared with the stored data to determine if it has been 
modified.  A skilled computer scientist, given access to the 
key used to assemble the hash table, could modify the 
signature to show that the stored data is accurate even if it is 
not [17]. 
 
D.  Required Implementation Schedule 
The deadlines for U.S. implementation of biometric 
passports, as well as implementation by other VWP 
countries, were delayed several times, with the final 
American deadline being October 26, 2006, for facial 
images stored on a contactless IC chip.  DHS policy at that 
time indicated that the United States would stop accepting 
passports under the Visa Waiver Program from individuals 
who were citizens of countries which had not begun issuing 
electronic passports by that date [10]. 
IV. SECURITY OBSTACLES 
A. Skimming 
Among the greatest concerns of security and privacy 
watchdog groups is the idea that an unscrupulous individual 
could “skim,” or secretly steal from a distance, the data 
stored on an electronic passport or other identity document's 
RFID chip.  While it is unclear what purpose this might 
serve, Americans have learned through the rise in identity 
theft that they must keep personal information as close as 
possible.  ICAO and International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) standards set a maximum of 10 cm on 
the distance from which the data can be read, but this limit is 
likely to have little effect in practice, as explained later in 
this section [15]. 
Groups including the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and Privacy International have questioned the use 
of contactless chips instead of comparable contact-based 
chips.  They feared a combination of identity theft and 
surveillance, both of which they believe could have been 
avoided through the use of other data storage technologies.  
At that time Privacy International indicated that it was 
“increasingly concerned that the biometric travel document 
initiative is part and parcel of a larger surveillance 
infrastructure monitoring the movement of individuals 
globally that includes Passenger-Name Record transfers, 
API systems and the creation of an intergovernmental 
network of interoperable electronic data systems to facilitate 
access to each country's law enforcement and intelligence 
information” [18]. 
Passive RFID chips, instead of requiring batteries for 
power, are powered by the magnetic field emitted from the 
reader.  The passport does not broadcast its own signal; 
rather, it reflects a modified version of the signal sent by the 
reader in order to communicate. 
The distance from which the chip can be read is a 
function of the power of the field generated by the reader, in 
conjunction with the physical parameters of the RFID chip.  
It is not a limit that can be completely set through 
modifications to the chip itself.  Studies have shown that the 
data on some of the early prototype electronic passports can 
be read using specialized readers from over 30 feet away.  
The equipment necessary to achieve this, however, cannot at 
this time be carried or operated discretely [19]. Generally, an 
increase in the power of the reader can increase the distance 
from which the chip can be read without the chip knowing 
the difference.  FCC standards prohibit signals from 
exceeding certain power levels (generally due to health 
concerns, e.g., cell phones), and often prohibit the 
production of devices which could deviate from the standard  
[20].  There is no assurance, however, that an individual or 
organization trying to gain unauthorized access to another’s 
passport would choose to operate within such boundaries. 
 
B. Basic Access Control 
Basic access control (BAC) causes the RFID chip itself to 
prevent access by unauthorized readers.  In order for a 
reader to access an electronic passport with basic access 
control, it would have to already know the individual key for 
that particular chip.  ICAO standards for basic access control 
focus on using a piece of passport-holder data from the 
printed data page’s MRZ as the key for accessing the chip.  
An incorrect key would result in a denial of access. The 





number and personal information as the key [21]. 
ICAO standards do not currently require basic access 
control, but rather recommend it along with other privacy 
and security enhancements.  The U.S. State Department, 
after substantial public input and outcry over an initial 
decision to not use BAC, opted to implement it on American 
passports to protect against unauthorized access. 
 
C. Transmission Encryption 
Another potential privacy concern exists during the 
transmission of data between the chip and the reader.  Just 
like with any wired or wireless communication, there is 
always the danger of an unauthorized user “snooping,” or 
listening in, on the transmission.  A number of different 
techniques can be employed to encrypt data.  Most depend 
on either a public key, which is a password held by all those 
authorized to access the data, or a private key, which is 
created and used for that specific transaction.  The ICAO 
has developed an interface which employs a public/private 
key encryption scheme, using the information printed on the 
data page of the passport to produce a key, in particular from 
the MRZ.  Encrypted transmission would commence 
immediately following basic access control authentication.  
The widely-recognized industry standard in electronic data 
transmission is 128-bit Secure Socket Layer technology 
[22]. 
 
D. Faraday Cage 
The State Department has recognized that security of the 
data stored on the chip is an essential piece of the research 
and development challenge for the electronic passport.  This 
is especially important given the possibility that future 
revisions of the passport may include additional, less 
publicly available biometric information like iris or 
fingerprint scans using the data structure using Document 
9303’s data structure which could be harmfully used against 
the rightful owner.  In 2005, under continued pressure from 
privacy groups and Congress, State opted to control access 
through the use of a Faraday cage, implemented by 
integrating thin metal fibers into the passport cover [21].  
The basic principle of a Faraday cage is that by encasing an 
object in metal, any electric or magnetic fields, such as the 
ones used to communicate with and power an RFID chip, 
can be prevented from passing through to the object.  Such 
protection would theoretically prevent reading of the 
passport without the cover being physically opened.  
Increases in the power of the reader field could theoretically 
“break through” the cage, but it provides an additional layer 
of security at minimal cost. 
 
V. EFFICACY OF PASSPORT REVISIONS 
A.  Biometric Issues 
Questions remain regarding the usefulness of the 
electronic passport as currently implemented in the United 
States, though many questions regarding privacy and 
security have been addressed to the satisfaction of outside 
interest groups.  Transmission and chip speed has proven to 
be a substantial issue.  Also, many have questioned the 
decision by the State Department to focus solely on facial 
recognition as a biometric feature of the passport [23]. 
The ICAO’s decision to choose facial recognition as the 
universal biometric for authenticating passports has also 
drawn fire from a number of directions.  In terms of the 
scientific community, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) noted in 2002 the technological 
superiority of ten-finger fingerprint recognition over most 
biometrics, including facial recognition [24].  This 
superiority is shown in Table II,   
Congress has also questioned the ICAO’s selection of 
facial recognition, with Congressman Christopher Cox (R-
Cal.), past chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee, insisting that a photograph is not a biometric.  
According to him, fingerprints are a more effective 
technology.  “We should move in the direction of that 
biometric that is most likely to keep us safe,” he indicated 
during a hearing in early July 2005 [24]. 
Despite some Congressional disagreement, the State 
Department continues to insist that Americans would not 
support a fingerprint-based travel document, given the 
popular association of fingerprints with criminal activity.  
Fingerprints are also a cornerstone of the US-VISIT 
program, though this program does not affect U.S. citizens 
[25]. 
Just like any technology, the range of international 
interest in biometrics includes a complete lack thereof in 
some countries, as well as daily life implementation in other 
countries.  Despite some resistance to the U.S.-established 
timeframe for implementation of the Document 9303-
compliant passport in all VWP countries, the European 
Commission endorsed the move to include biometric 
technologies in its passports.  On October 26, 2004, the EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Council also voted to include 
fingerprints as a second mandatory identifier in future 
passports issued by EU members [26]. 
Debates over the use of biometrics in national 
identification cards recently center stage in the United 
Kingdom, with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Labour Party 
pushing for a biometrically-enhanced national identification 
card.  The British government, looking to capitalize on the 
research investments made by the ICAO and VWP countries 
in passport technology, publicly announced its intent to 
pursue national identification card legislation in late 2004.  





provide a simple and secure ‘gold standard’ for proving 
identity, protecting people from identity fraud and theft and 
providing them with a convenient means of verifying their 
identity in everyday transactions.”  Public research 
conducted between July 2002 and January 2003, showed 
that 79 percent of British respondents favored the 
introduction of identity cards with technology similar to that 
of the ICAO-defined electronic passport [27]. 
 
B. Addressing Security Concerns 
Despite the apparent effectiveness of the techniques for 
maintaining document described in section IV, more subtle 
concerns have continued to emerge regarding finer details of 
the integrity of the electronic passport and similar RFID-
based identity documents. Techniques like basic access 
control and the Faraday cage have made it very difficult to 
track or access identity document data when implemented 
and have allayed many fears regarding surveillance and 
identity theft. 
One widely-noted outstanding concern relates to the ISO 
14443 standard’s collision avoidance / medium access 
control features.  Chips designed under the standard’s type 
A specification broadcast a unique identifier which is then 
received by the tag reader. The reader then uses these 
identifiers to select tags to broadcast at particular times.  
Type B devices instead use the slotted aloha MAC protocol, 
which potentially requires more transmissions and delays 
transaction completion [14]. 
The type A scheme could potentially result in a trackable, 
open-access, unencrypted identifier if not chosen 
dynamically, even on a chip which uses basic access control.  
The type B scheme can pose a challenge in certain 
application environments, however, as it requires more 
advanced clock function than type A. Document 9303 
allows either type A or type B contactless IC’s in electronic 
passports [14]. 
 
C. Rollout Success 
Progress toward deployment of ISO 14443 and ICAO 
Document 9303-compliant passports varies greatly between 
member EU member states.  Had the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security not granted the extension to October 
2006, only six European Union members – Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden – 
had a chance of meeting the original 2005 deadline.  Once 
the final deadline was reached, only three countries—
Andorra, Brunei, and Liechtenstein—had not begun issuing 
the electronic passport [28]. 
VI. RFID’S IMPACT 
A. Electronic Passport 
RFID has opened the door to new opportunities in identity 
and travel documents, though much of its promise remains 
out of reach in the interest of privacy and security.  With the 
electronic passport specification as a basis, future licenses 
and identification cards can be built off of contactless IC 
technology, taking advantage of its amorphous form factor, 
ample storage space, and computational power. 
The electronic passport itself opens the door to new ways 
of issuing visas.  The Document 9303 logical data structure 
allows for optional storage of visa information on the RFID 
chip itself [16].  Additionally, because the contactless design 
does not require any particular orientation or line of sight, 
future visas could be RFID tags themselves, attached to 
blank pages in the passport.  Effective MAC protocol design 
would allow for the reading of both visas and passport data 
in one swipe.  
 
B. Common Access Card 
Future versions of the CAC may include RFID for access 
control purposes, though the existing contact-based version 
is considered the “gold standard” for internal government 
identity documents [29].  A 2001 working group also 
acknowledged the potential use of biometrics on the CAC as 
a means of achieving “three-factor authentication” and 
potentially counteracting any added security risk resulting 
from the use of a contactless chip. 
 
C. Driver’s Licenses 
Initial indications are that RFID may not be the 
technology of choice for the implementation of the Real ID 
Act and its resulting standardization of state driver’s 
licenses, as a draft DHS report issued in early 2006 warned 
against the use of RFID for data storage in identity 
documents or in any human tracking application. It also 
noted that though the intended function of an RFID tag 
could be data storage and easy access, this could morph over 
time if left unchecked [30].   There is also some speculation 
that Congress may choose to revisit Real ID as the deadline 
TABLE II 
ACCURACY OF SELECTED BIOMETRICS 




(with all fingerprints 
taken by experienced 
officers) 










Analysis of the accuracy of biometrics used by some countries 
in conjunction with the electronic passport, as conducted by 










The implementation of electronic passport has not been 
without challenges, and some continue to challenge the use 
of contactless technology in the passport and other identity 
documents.  Privacy groups voiced substantial concerns 
about the means by which the data and picture are stored, 
and questions regarding the effectiveness of the biometric 
technology still remain.  At the same time, other government 
agencies have chosen different technologies for securing 
their identity documents, and new opinions on the use of 
RFID for identity purposes have been formed.  Congress has 
set arbitrary deadlines for implementations without 
understanding the technological challenges involved. 
We analyzed the major current and potential uses of RFID 
in identity documents.  We identified some of the areas of 
promise for existing and future deployments, and we 
considered the security concerns which accompany them.  
Most important among these was the theme that future 
implementers of RFID-based identity documents should take 
note of the challenges involved in deploying the electronic 
passport, and should appreciate the need for document 
security at all steps in the development process. 
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